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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
AUTOMOBILES-INJURIES
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HIGHWAY-

WHIETnER OR NOT OWNER OF PARKED AUTOMOBILE WHO LFrAvEs KEY IN
IGNITION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INJURIES INFLICTED BY THIEF WHO STEALs

CAR-The Illinois Supreme Court, faced with the need for resolving an
apparent conflict of opinion between the Appellate Courts of the state, 1
1 Compare the holding in Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N. E. (2d) 537
(1948), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RmEEw 225, with the decision in Cockrell v.

Sullivan, 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N. E. (2d) 878 (1951), noted in 30 CmCAGo-KENT
LAW REF=w 277.

CHICAGO-KENT

LA kWREVIEW

appears to have taken jurisdiction of the case of Ney v. Yellow Cab Company 2 on certificate of importance s for the purpose of resolving that conflict. The defendant therein, by its servant, negligently allowed a taxicab
to stand unattended on a public street with the key in the ignition and
the engine running, contrary to a certain provision of the Illinois Uniform
Traffic Act.4 A thief stole the taxicab and while in flight, ran into plaintiff's parked vehicle, causing property damage. The plaintiff's complaint
charged that the breach of this statute constituted a prima facie case of
negligence in that the defendant could reasonably have foreseen the consequences. Defendant's motion to dismiss and for judgment was denied,
and judgment was entered for the plaintiff when defendant elected to
stand by the motion. The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed
the lower court's decision and the Supreme Court, one judge dissenting,
also affirmed.
The general area of the law which relates to the effect on civil liability
produced by a violation of a statute is one consisting of many finely drawn
distinctions, many of which, upon examination, appear to be based more
upon differences in statutory wording than upon rules of interpretation
applied by the courts. In the majority of the cases, the violation of a
statute which is penal in nature leads to a finding that such a breach
amounts to negligence per se and is actionable at the instance of those
5
Some courts, on
persons for whose protection the statute was enacted.
22 Ill. (2d) 74, 117 N. E. (2d) 74 (1954), noted in 42 Il. B. J. 580, affirming
348 111. App. 161, 108 N. E. (2d) 508 (1953). Hershey, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199(2).
4 Ibid., Ch. 95%, § 189, in part, provides: "No person driving or in charge of a
motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine,
locking the ignition and removing the key, or when standing upon any perceptible
grade without effectively setting the brakes thereon and turning the front wheels to
the curb or side of the highway." Punishment for the violation thereof is by fine
to be imposed pursuant to Ch. 95%, § 234.
5 Wolf v. Smith, 149 Ala. 457, 42 So. 824 (1906) ; Simoneau v. Pacific Electric R.
Co., 166 Cal. 264, 136 P. 544 (1913); Lindsay v. Cecchi, 3 Boyce 133, 80 A. 523
(Dela., 1911); Western & A. R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397, 7 S. E. 912 (1888);
Curoe v. Spokane & I. E. R. Co., 32 Ida. 643, 186 P. 1101 (1920) ; Northern Indiana
Transit Co. v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 89 N. E. (2d) 905 (1950) ; Burk v. Creamery
Package Mfg. Co., 126 Iowa 739, 102 N. W. 793 (1905); Clements v. Louisiana
Electric Light Co., 44 La. Ann. 692, 11 So. 51 (1892) ; Bahel v. Manning, 112 Mich.
24, 70 N. W. 327 (1897) ; Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N. W. 543 (1889) ;
Larson v. Webb, 332 Mo. 370, 58 S. W. (2d) 967 (1932) ; Conway v. Monidah Trust
Co., 47 Mont. 269, 132 P. 26 (1913) ; Hoopes v. Creighton, 100 Neb. 510, 160 N. W.
742 (1916); Johnson v. Boston & M. R. Co., 83 N. H. 350, 143 A. 516 (1928);
Cosgrove v. New York, C. & H. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. 88 (1881); Stone v. Texas Co.,
180 N. C. 546, 105 S. E. 425 (1920) ; Wilson v. Northern P. R. Co., 30 N. D. 456,
153 N. W. 429 (1915) ; Skinner v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N. E. 722
(1933) ; Speight v. Simonsen, 115 Ore. 618, 239 P. 542 (1925) ; Jinks v. Currie, 324
Pa. 532, 188 A. 356 (1936) ; Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S. C. 500, 20 S. E.
(2d) 153 (1942) ; Wise v. Morgan, 101 Tenn. 273, 48 S. W. 971 (1898) ; Hayes v.
Gainesville Street R. Co., 70 Tex. 602, 8 S. W. 491 (1888); Kilpatrick v. Grand
Trunk R. Co., 74 Vt. 288, 52 A. 531 (1902) ; Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co.,
68 W. Va. 405, 69 S. P. 857 (1910) ; Bentson v. Brown, 186 Wis. 629, 203 N. W. 380
(1925).
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the other hand, would regard the statutory violation as supporting no
more than a prima facie case of negligence,8 sufficient to form a basis from
which a jury might infer negligence but as to which no presumption at
law would be raised.7 Regardless of the determination by the court as
to the evidentiary weight to be allotted to such facts, however, the plaintiff,
in order to set forth and sustain the cause of action, must show (1) a
causal connection existing between the statutory breach and the injury
sustained by him," (2) that the legislature intended to prevent the injury
of which he complains, 9 and (3) that he is one of a group over whom such
protection has been extended. 10
Against this background, it might be said that those courts in the
various jurisdictions with statutory provisions similar to the one construed in the instant case, and where the like problem has arisen, have
had considerable difficulty in arriving at the legislative intention with the
result that they have reached diametrically opposed conclusions under
similar factual situations.1 When so doing, they have regarded the necessary causal connection, without which responsibility for injuries resulting
in the movement of an unattended vehicle would not attach, to be one substantially intertwined with the legislative purpose existing at the time of
the enactment of the statutory provision involved. It would seem to be
apparent, from an examination of these statutes, with their additional
provisions in context requiring that brakes be set and wheels turned to
the curb on a grade, that the ultimate purpose was one directed toward
public safety and not one with respect to theft deterrence. Even so, a
finding that the provision was either an anti-theft measure or a safety precaution would not, in itself, supply the necessary causal bridge since there
would still have to be a showing that the harm complained of was the one
6 Johnson v. Pendergast, 30 Ill. 255, 139 N. E. 407 (1923); Rowley v. Cedar
Rapids, 203 Iowa 1245, 212 N. W. 158 (1927) ; Fowler v. Enzenperger, 77 Kan. 406,
94 P. 995 (1908) ; Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Contr. Co., 106 W. Va. 99, 144 S. E. 881
(1928). See also annotation in 21 A. L. R. (2d) 20.
7 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Metcalf, 44 Neb. 848, 63 N. W. 51 (1895).
8 Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N. E. 182 (1892).
9 Johnston v. Cornelius, 200 Mich. 209, 166 N. W. 983 (1918).
10 Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal. (2d) 488, 127 P. (2d) 1 (1942) ; Rischof v. Illinois
Southern R. Co., 232 Ill. 446, 83 N. E. 948 (1908).
11 Recovery has been allowed in Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106
N. E. (2d) 395 (1952) ; Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N. E. (2d) 560 (1948),
overruling Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N. E. (2d) 1001 (1941) ; Andersen
v. Thiesen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N. W. (2d) 272 (1950). Contra: Ross v. Hartman,
78 App. D. C. 217, 139 F. (2d) 14, 158 A. L. R. 1370 (1943), cert. den. 321 U. S. 790,
64 S. Ct. 790, 88 L. Ed. 1080 (1943), reversing Squires v. Brooks, 44 App. D. C. 320
(1916) ; Richards v. Stanley, - Cal. (2d) -, 271 P. (2d) 23 (1954). In the last
mentioned case, the California Supreme Court refused to follow the rationale of the
instant case, although familiar with the decision therein, because (1) no comparable
statute was involved, and (2) the foreseeable risk of negligent driving by a thief was
said to be no greater than the one believed present when an owner loaned his car to
another.
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which the legislature intended to avoid. 1 2 In that connection, it is pertinent
to inquire whether the act of an intermeddler was one within the contemplation of the legislature.
The bulk of the cases dealing with negligence in parking and liability
for resulting injury involve either a movement of the vehicle independently
of human action or a movement brought about by the intervening acts
of children. In the latter situation, provided the person leaving the car
unattended had a substantial basis for believing that children might be
tempted to meddle with the mechanism, he has generally been held to
answer for the resulting damage. 13 A finding of this nature is due chiefly
to the existence of the special added circumstance for the general rule has
been stated to be that "where the car is started by a third person, any
negligence there may be on the part of the owner in leaving it unattended
is regarded as not the proximate cause of the injury, and therefore, there
is held to be no liability.' 1 4 Can it, then, be said that a special circumstance exists in the theft cases sufficient to take the case out of the realm
of the general rule?
In the absence of statute or ordinance, 15 there has been little occasion
for any divergence of opinion among the courts on the point of denying
responsibility on the part of the owner for injury sustained through the
negligent operation of an automobile by a thief, despite the fact the key
was left in the vehicle, 1 6 as the theft has generally been regarded as an
efficient intervening cause. 1 7 In that connection, the law quite uniformly
12 Where the measure has been determined to be one to promote precaution

against theft, civil recovery will be denied: Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359,
61 N. E. (2d) 330 (1945). See also note in 35 Minn. L. Rev. 81.
13 Moran v. Borden, 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N. E. (2d) 166 (1941) ; Lomano v. Ideal
Towel Supply Co., 51 A. (2d) 888 (N. J. Dist., 1947) ; Connell v. Berland, 223
App. Div. 234, 228 N. Y. S. 20 (1928) ; Gumbrell v. Clausen Flanagen Brewery Co.,
199 App. Div. 778, 192 N. Y. S. 451 (1922). The contrary result will follow if no
reason to foresee tampering exists: Jackson v. Mills-Fox Baking Co., 221 Mich. 64,
190 N. W. 740 (1922) ; Kennedy v. Hedberg, 159 Minn. 76, 198 N. W. 302 (1924);
Rhad v. Duquesne Light Co., 255 Pa. 409, 100 A. 262 (1917).
14 See 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, § 338, at p. 684.
15 It should be noted that, even in the presence of a statute or ordinance, the terms
thereof may be such as to prevent reliance thereon for the purpose of establishing
civil liability: Richards v. Stanley, - Cal. App. (2d) -, 260 P. (2d) 277 (1953).
16 Roberts v. Lundy, 301 Mich. 726, 4 N. W. (2d) 74 (1942) ; Lotito v. Kyriacus,
272 App. Div. 891, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 157 (1946), affirmed in 295 N. Y. 667, 65 N. E.
(2d) 101 (1946) ; Walter v. Bond, 267 App. Div. 779, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 378 (1943) ;
Mann v. Parshall, 229 App. Dlv. 366, 241 N. Y. S. 673 (1930) ; Midkiff v. Watkins,
52 So. (2d) 573 (La. App., 1951); Castay v. Katz-Besthoff, Ltd., 148 So. 76 (La.
App., 1933); Rhad v. Duquesne Light Co., 255 Pa. 409, 100 A. (2d) 262 (1917);
Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 54 A. (2d) 520 (1948) ; Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14
N. J. Super. 94, 81 A. (2d) 377 (1951); Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N. J. Super. 254,
78 A. (2d) 288 (1951) ; Wright v. L. C. Powers & Sons, 238 Ky. 572, 38 S. W. (2d)
465 (1931).
17 The case of Neering v. Illnois Central R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N. E. (2d) 497
(1943), while not an automobile case, contains an excellent discussion on the point
of intervening causation with respect to criminal acts by third persons.
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recognizes that, where the intervening cause of the injury is a criminal
act, even one made less difficult of performance by the first actor's negligence, the negligent person is not regarded as bound to foresee such crime,
hence will not be held responsible' s for the original negligence is said to
be, at the most, no more than a remote cause. This severance in the
causal connection is not one operative in all cases and under every set of
circumstances for there may be times where the intervention of the criminal
act might reasonably have been foreseen. For this reason, all of the surrounding circumstances must be taken into account, including the nature
of the locale and the prevalence of crime, as these facts may have great
bearing upon the ultimate degree of care imposed upon the negligent
owner. 19 Additional factors of this character, while not disclosed in the
opinion, may have lent some support for the finding in the instant case.
Another proposition which has been argued, and may have affected
the decisions in cases of this nature, one which is also involved with the
underlying issue of proximate cause and foreseeability, deals with the time
lapse and distance intervening between the theft of the vehicle and the
subsequent injury. Some courts have expressly disaffirmed the placing
of any weight on the fact that the thief was in the act of fleeing at the
time20 but others appear to have placed great reliance upon that fact. 2 1
It would seem, however, that this point should be accorded some attention
for, even in those jurisdictions which will allow recovery, it would seem to
be pushing the doctrine to absurd lengths to say that the negligent owner
should be held responsible for all subsequent negligent acts of the thief
occurring while the thief continued in possession. 22 If this view ever became law it would be a move most strongly in the direction of making the
owner an insurer with respect to every accident involving his vehicle no
matter how far removed from his original negligence the ultimate injury
18 See, in general, 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, § 71, and annotation In 78 A. L. R. 471.
19 Some courts have seized upon this fact as providing an opportunity for the
making of a favorable comparison between the crime rate in their own jurisdictions
and that found in others. See, for example, Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App.
587 at 596, 106 N. E. (2d) 396 at 399, where the court said: "We do not presume to
affirm or deny that circumstances are highly probable in the District of Columbia
or the First District of the Appellate Court of Illinois. We do assert with some
satisfaction that such circumstances are not reasonably foreseeable in this jurisdiction."
20 Wannebo v. Gates, 227 Minn. 194, 34 N. W. (2d) 695 (1948).
21 Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N. E. (2d) 537 (1948).
22 Search reveals no case in which the negligent owner has been held liable for
an accident occurring at some time subsequent to what might be termed "flight."
The dissenting opinion of Niemeyer, P. J., in Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359,
77N. E. (2d) 537 (1948), appears to turn on the fact that the record did not support
a finding of "flight." Might not the owner be said to have done all he could to
prevent further harm by reporting the theft to the police? That fact would tend to
absolve him from any prosecution for violations of the criminal law arising after
the theft of the car.
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to the third party might be, a result not at all in harmony with the prevailing current doctrine that an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality per se. Granted that the legislature may have intended to impose liability on the careless owner for the acts of the thief while in the
course of his theft, there is nothing in the text of the statutory provision
in question to suggest that the legislature ever intended to achieve so
substantial an extension of common law principles.
While the Illinois Supreme Court, at the time of affirming the denial
of the defendant's motion, indicated that the fundamental question was
one for the determination of a jury23 and that it did not wish to be understood as refusing, by implication, to follow the majority decision in the
Palsgraf case,24 it would seem that it has extended the conception of
proximate cause, as delineated by Judge Cardozo in that decision, beyond
reasonable limits in order to arrive at what some may claim to be a more
just conclusion. Its finding that the legislature must be understood as
having intended to provide a degree of protection from criminal acts by
drafting a portion of a statute which, taken as a whole, could have only one
apparent purpose, that of providing for protection from reasonably foreseeable movements of a vehicle, is one which is strained. That the violation of the provision would be negligence to some degree may be admitted
but, in the absence of a clear revelation of the legislative mind,25 it would
seem unwarranted to extend the field of liability over so broad an area.
As one writer has put it, "legal responsibility must be limited to those
causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must
be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some
social idea of justice or policy." 26 The holding in the instant case, by con27
trast, provides virtually no boundary whatever.
J. L. FOOLE
23 Courts which have allowed a recovery have not been uniform on this point but
the difference seems to be based on the weight given to the negligence said to be
present in a finding that the statute had been breached. See Ross v. Hartman,
78 App. D. C. 217, 139 F. (2d) 14, 158 A. L. R. 1370 (1943), as an example of a
case where the question of causation was held to be a matter of law.
24 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 169 N. E. 99 (1928).
25 If evidence is needed that the legislature knows how to write a statute so as
to provide with certainty for both civil and criminal consequences for its violation,
reference could be made to the "civil rights" provisions set forth in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 125 et seq.
26 Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1941),
p. 312.
27 It Is to be expected that a modern jury, faced with a choice between deciding
for a completely innocent injured plaintiff or in favor of a somewhat neglectful
defendant, even though the latter was no more than careless with respect to the
safety of his own property, would seldom hesitate to vote in favor of the former.
Unless contributory negligence could be shown, the defendant would then be without any really effective defense.
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PERIOD IS VOID FROM INCEPTION - Interpretation of an Illinois statute
regulating the duration of chattel mortgages' was called for in the recent
case of In re Beale,2 a matter heard by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. The reclamation petition filed therein
alleged that one Beale had executed an installment note in favor of the
petitioners and had given a chattel mortgage to secure the same. By the
terms of these instruments, final payment on the debt was to be made five
years and three months after the date thereof. Prior to maturity, and
while a substantial balance remained unpaid on the debt, the mortgagor
was adjudged an involuntary bankrupt and his assets, including the
mortgaged property, came into the hands of a receiver in bankruptcy who
refused to surrender the goods to petitioner on the claim the mortgage
was void ab initio. The Referee so ruled but the District Court reversed,
remanding the matter with instructions to treat the chattel mortgage as
effective, at least for the period fixed by the statute, despite its overlyextended duration.
Every American jurisdiction possesses a statutory system providing
for the filing or recording of chattel mortgages, all with the object of giving notice to third persons of the existence of the mortgage and of the
lien afforded thereby as a substitute for the common law notice provided
by delivery of possession of the mortgaged chattels to the mortgagee. While
these statutes agree as to the object to be attained, they differ widely in
the method to be pursued to accomplish that objective. In general, however, they agree on the point that the lien period should not be left entirely to the agreement of the parties but should be confined to statutory
limits, varying from two to six years, with the possibility of an effective
extension of the original force of the chattel mortgage under some form
of renewal executed or filed in the manner directed by statute.3 An additional purpose served by these statutes, particularly those providing that
a chattel mortgage shall be void as against creditors and subsequent purchasers of the mortgagor after the expiration of the statutory period, is to
clear the record by raising a conclusive presumption of payment in the
event there is no filing of a renewal affidavit prior to the expiration of the
4
statutory period.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 4, states: "No mortgage . . . of personal
property... shall be valid ... unless it shall be deposited for filing ... Provided
that the period of such mortgage... shall not exceed five years from the receipt of
such instrument for filing."
2.117 F. Supp. 149 (1953).
3 Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales (Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis,
1933), 6th Ed. by Bowers, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, §§ 190-235.
4 Hanson v. Blum, 53 N. Dak. 526, 207 N. W. 144 (1926).
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Against this general background, the Referee, denying petitioner's
prayer for reclamation, had relied on an earlier Illinois case, that of Silvis
v. C. Altman & Company,5 which had held a similar chattel mortgage
void ab initio. That result had been attained under a chattel mortgage
statute then in effect which provided in substance that a chattel mortgage
would be valid until maturity of the entire obligation "provided such
time shall not exceed two years." 6 The phrase "such time" was there
construed to require that the entire debt should mature within two years
on the ground that, if it did not, the mortgage would violate the express
wording of the statute, hence would be void from inception. In reversing
the Referee, the District Court distinguished that statute, as so construed,
from the one presently in force 7 on the ground the purpose of the present
statute, from its amended wording, was one designed to provide for a limitation on validity rather than to invalidate the chattel mortgage from the
start. As so construed, the statute served to limit the effective lien period
of the mortgage but not to invalidate the debt itself.
This construction of the present Illinois statute appears to be more
in conformity with those Illinois cases which arose since the Silvis case but
which were based on later amendments to the original 1874 statute. In
Jones v. Noel,8 for example, the court said that a chattel mortgage lien,
being nothing more than a statutory creature, could continue no longer
than the period within which the mortgage complied with statutory requirements. This, in effect, meant that a chattel mortgage which matured
beyond the statutory period would be valid, at least during such period,
rather than void from its inception. The still later case of Keller v. Robinson,9 decided under the 1891 amendment, 10 an amendment which authorized the extension of the maturity of the mortgage upon the filing of a
proper affidavit showing renewal, likewise indicated that extension of the
lien beyond the then two-year period depended only upon the filing of the
required affidavit." The issue was again raised in the case of Friend v.
Johnson12 but the court there avoided giving an opinion on the particular
proposition. It did, however, following upon the 1931 amendment to the
5 141 Inl. 632, 31 N. E. 11 (1892).
6

Rev. Stat. 1874, Ch. 95, § 4.

§ 4.
8 139 Ill. 377, 28 N. E. 805 (1890).
9 153 Ill. 458, 38 N. E. 1072 (1894). See also Fallows v. Continental & Commercial
T. & S. Bank, 235 U. S. 300, 35 S. Ct. 29, 59 L. Ed. 238 (1914).
10 Ill. Laws 1891, p. 171, § 1.
11 The holding therein may be said to have revived the early decision of Cook v.
Thayer, 11 Ill. 617 (1850), where it was said that a chattel mortgage, the maturity
date of which exceeded the then statutory lien period, would be valid during the
period but not afterward.
1268 Ill. App. 661 (1896).
7 Ili. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95,

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

statute,' 8 again face the point in the case of Busch v. Tatar14 where it
rendered a clear and direct opinion which, in effect, affirmed the Keller
case.
The holding in the instant case, giving interpretation to the statute as
last amended in 1953,'1 properly agrees with the earlier views so noted for,
as now worded, the present statute is essentially no different than it was
then although the duration of the several time periods has been enlarged.
The principal issue discussed, however, arises wholly because of inadequate
statutory wording. The problem could be avoided if the statute, after
specifying the steps necessary to create a valid lien, then continued with
a statement to the effect that the chattel mortgage should cease to be valid
after the expiration of a designated number of years from the date of
filing unless renewed by proper affidavit. Such language would eliminate
the problem of whether or not a chattel mortgage designed to run longer
than the statutory lien period would be void ab initio.
J. M. BROWN

CORPORATIONs-DISsOLUTION AND FORFEITURE OF FRANCHISE-WH1ETHER A DISSOLVED CORPORATION CAN BE SUBJECTED TO A CRIMINAL PROSECU-

TION-The United States, prosecuting in the recent case of United States
v. P. F. Collier & Son Corporation,' filed a criminal information against
a Delaware corporation charging it with a violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 2 A motion to quash the service and to dismiss the information was made on behalf of the corporation on the ground that it had
been dissolved under an applicable Delaware statute more than eight
months prior to the filing of the information. This motion was sustained
in the district court on the theory that a corporation, after dissolution,
may not be subjected to a criminal prosecution for acts committed prior
to dissolution. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held to the contrary when it concluded that a pertinent Delaware statute,'
18 Ill. Laws 1831, p. 669, § 1.
14 271 Ill. App. 8 (1933). The holding therein accords with the decision in Reynolds v. Case, 60 Mich. 76, 26 N. W. 838 (1886), and in First National Bank of
Yankton v. Magner, 47 S. Dak, 80, 195 N. W. 1020 (1923).
15 11. Laws 1953, p. 1274; H. B. No. 960.
1 208 F. 936 (1953). Finnegan, J., wrote a concurring opinion.
2 29 U. S. C. A., § 201 et seq.
8 Dela. Rev. Code 1935, Ch. 65, § 42, as amended by Dela. Laws 1941, Ch. 132, § 11,
provides as follows: "All corporations, whether they expire by their own limitation,
or are otherwise dissolved, shall nevertheless be continued for the term of three
years from such expiration or dissolution bodies corporate for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against them ... and with respect to any action,
suit or proceeding begun or commenced by or against the corporation within three
years after the date of such expiration or dissolution, such corporation shall only
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one which provided that any action, suit, or proceeding could be brought
by or against a dissolved corporation within three years after dissolution,
was broad enough to encompass all forms of litigation and to provide
for the survival of remedies, including criminal prosecutions.
It is now generally conceded that a corporation may be held criminally, as well as civilly, liable for its acts, 4 particularly for crimes wherein
intent is not a necessary element, 5 but cases do ,exist where corporations
have been held guilty of such crimes as larceny,6 obtaining money under
false pretense, 7 criminal libel,8 and homicide. 9 While the corporation
cannot be arrested or incarcerated, it may be fined and, in addition, be
dissolved under appropriate proceedings, especially for having committed
crimes in which an intent is required.' 0 It is also another generally established legal principle that a corporation, upon dissolution, is legally
dead and without existence" so, in the absence of a statute continuing the
existence of the defunct corporation for the purpose of suit, no action can
be brought by or against a dissolved corporation 1 2 and all actions pending
for the purpose of such actions, suits or proceedings so begun or commenced be
continued bodies corporate beyond said three-year period and until any judgments,
orders, or decrees therein shall be fully executed."
4American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U. S. 519, 63 S. Ct. 327,
87 L. Ed. 434 (1943) ; New York Central v. United States, 212 U. S.481, 29 S. Ct.
304, 53 L. Ed. 613 (1909) ; Boyd v. United States, 275 F. 16 (1921) ; United States
v. American Socialist Society, 260 F. 885 (1919) ; United States v. Nearing, 252 F.
223 (1918) ; People v. Strong, 363 Ill. 602, 2 N. E. (2d) 942 (1936).
5 People v. Saline County Coal Co., 206 Ill. App. 266 (1917).
6 People v. Canadian Fur Trappers' Corp., 248 N. Y. 159, 161 N. E. 455, 59 A. L. R.
372 (1928) ; People v. Hudson Valley R. Co., 217 N. Y. 172, 111 N. E. 472 (1916).
7 Sigretto v. State, 127 N. J.L. 518, 24 A. (2d) 199 (1942).
8 Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445, 44
A. L. R. 159 (1899).
9 State v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 90 N. J. L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917) ; People v.
Orzel, 263 N. Y. 200, 188 N. E. 648 (1934).
10 In People v. Duncan, 363 Ill. 495, 2 N. E. (2d) 705 (1936), the court said that
a corporation could not be indicted for the violation of a criminal statute where
the punishment consisted of imprisonment or death only, but in case the statutory
penalty amounted to both fine and imprisonment it could be punished by the imposition of a fine. See also State v. Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N. C. 610, 69 S.E. 58
(1910).
11 Pendleton v. Russell, 144 U. S. 640, 12 S. Ct. 743, 36 L. Ed. 574 (1892) ; First
Nat. Bank of Selma v. Colby, 88 U. S.(21 Wall.) 609, 22 L. Ed. 687 (1875) ; Mumma
v. Potomac Co., 33 U. S. (8 Pet.) 281, 8 L. Ed. 945 (1834). In Markus v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 373 Ill. 557, 27 N. E. (2d) 463, 128 A. L. R. 567 (1940), the court
held that the dissolution of a corporation is, in legal effect, the same as the death
of a n~tural person. See also Shore Management Corp. v. Erickson, 314 Ill. App.
571, 41 N. E. (2d) 972 (1942).
12 Hanson v. McLeod, 174 Ark. 270, 294 S. W. 998 (1927); Young Construction
Co. v. Dunne, 123 Kan. 176, 254 P. 323 (1927) ; United States Truck Co. v. Penn.
Surety Corp., 259 Mich. 422, 243 N. W. 311 (1932) ; MacAffer v. Boston & M. R.
Co., 242 App. Div. 140, 273 N. Y. S. 679 (1934); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v.
McFarland, 143 Okla. 252, 288 P. 468 (1930); Mt. Union v. Kunz, 290 Pa. 356,
139 A. 118 (1927) ; Shepherd v. Kress Box Co., 154 Va. 421, 153 S.E. 649 (1930).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

at the time of dissolution must be abated. 13 It follows, therefore, that a
dissolved corporation, guilty of criminal acts during the period of its
existence, may be prosecuted criminally or sued civilly only if and to the
extent expressly authorized by the law of the state of its incorporation. 4
Unless that law provides for criminal prosecution subsequent to dissolution, the state would be helpless in its efforts to punish the dissolved corporation for its crime.
Returning to the case at hand, it must be noted that the court was faced
with the problem of construing the pertinent Delaware statute without the
aid of any local interpretation on the point for there does not appear to be
a single Delaware decision construing the statute in the light of the problem under discussion. While the court could have used a variety of legal
rules concerning statutory construction, it simply declared that there was
''no room to speculate on the legislative intent "15 saying the statute was
plainly intended to include criminal proceedings, hence there was no
reason to go behind the language of the act. In that connection, it admitted that many jurisdictions have held that such terms as "any action"
or "any suit" would not be broad enough in scope to include criminal
6
prosecutions, being terms most frequently used to refer to civil matters,'
but there was said to be abundant authority for the holding that the word
"proceeding" would be broad enough, in ordinary and usual legislative
17
and judicial usage, to include criminal matters.
13 Newhall v. Western Zinc Mining Co., 164 Cal. 380, 128 P. 1049 (1912) ; Bruin v.
Katz Drug Co., 351 Mo. 731, 173 S. W. (2d) 906 (1943).
14 Defense Supplies Corporation v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U. S. 631, 69 S.
Ct. 762, 82 L. Ed. 147 (1949) ; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Building
Corporation, 302 U. S. 120, 58 S. Ct. 125, 80 L. Ed. 147 (1937) ; Oklahoma Natural
Gas. Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U. S. 257, 47 S. Ct. 391, 71 L. Ed. 634 (1927) ; O'Neill v.
Continental Illinois Co., 341 Ill. App. 119, 93 N. E. (2d) 160 (1950). But see the
case of Dr. Hess & Clark, Inc. v. Metalsalts Corp., 119 F. Supp. 427 (1954), where
the court held that a dissolution in the state of Incorporation would have no bearing
on the right to sue the dissolved corporation in a state where it had been licensed

to do business if the corporation had not also complied with the dissolution provi-

sions of the latter state.

15 208 F. (2d) 936 at 940.
16 Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 289, 7 L. Ed. 481 (1829);
Pope v. State, 124 Ga. 801, 53 S. E. 384 (1906) ; Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass.
320, 175 N. E. 718 (1931) ; Worcester Color Co. v. Wood's Sons Co., 209 Mass. 105,
95 N. E. 392 (1911); Patterson v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 178 Mich. 288, 144
N. W. 491 (1913) ; Hodges v. Lassiter, 96 N. C. 351, 2 S. E. 923 (1887). For contrary decisions, see United States v. Backer, 134 F. (2d) 533 (1943) ; Gund Brewing
Co. v. United States, 204 F. 17 (1913) ; United States v. Moore, 11 F. 248 (1882) ;
Kelliher v. People, 71 Colo. 202, 205 P. 274 (1922) ; Commonwealth v. Moore, 143
Mass. 136, 9 N. E. 25 (1886).
17 United States v. Schalliger Produce Co., 230 F. 290 (1914) ; United States v.
Auerbach, 68 F. Supp. 776 (1946); Lindsay v. Allen, 113 Tenn. 517, 82 S. W. 648
(1904). Of particular significance is the repeated use of the term "proceeding" in
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Rules 20, 21(a), 21(b), 21(c), 53,
54(b) (4), and 54(b) (5) for instances in which the term has been used without the
qualifying adjective "criminal." In Rules 1, 2, 12(a), 39(b) (1), 46(b), 55, and 59,
however, the term has been modified by the qualifying adjective. See also United
States v. Borden Co., 28 F. Supp. 177 (1939).
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The leading case to the contrary conclusion, however, is that of United
States v. Safeway Stores, Inc.' 8 In that case, a criminal action had been
instituted against six corporations which had been organized in four different states but all of which corporate defendants had been dissolved
prior to the return of the indictment. All of the corporate defendants
argued that the action should be abated and the Court of Appeals for the
20
19
Second Circuit supported the view that the Delaware and Nevada
statutes, which authorized the post-dissolution prosecution and defending
of "suits by and against them," applied only to civil suits; that the California statute, 21 with its reference to "actions by or against" the corporation, did not embrace criminal prosecutions; and the Texas statute, 22 providing for the survival of "judicial proceedings," was not applicable.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in the case of United States
v. Line Material Company,23 one in which a defendant Delaware corporation, dissolved by merger several months after the return of the indictment,
was also successful in raising the defense of dissolution to defeat a criminal
prosecution, has likewise adopted the view that the precise statute involved in the instant case pertains only to civil suits in contrast to criminal
actions. The current holding is, therefore, not one free from doubt.
Another approach to the problem at hand may be seen in the case of
United States v. Leche. 24 The federal government there instituted a proceeding against a Texas corporation to recover a fine for the commission
of a public offense and was met with a motion to abate the proceedings
on the ground the corporation, subsequent to the return of the indictment,
had been dissolved under an appropriate state statute. 25 The court, dismissing the action, appears to have erroneously reasoned that a state
statute could have no effect on a criminal proceeding based upon a violation of a federal statute but then went to the length of saying that, as
the cause of action arose under a federal statute and the proceeding was
140 F. (2d) 834 (1944).
The statute is set forth in note 3, ante. It is interesting to note that the court
completely ignored the word "proceeding" used in that statute.
"All corporations,
20 Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, § 1664, in part reads as follows:
18
19

whether they expire by their own limitation, or are otherwise dissolved, shall
nevertheless for the term of three years from such expiration or dissolution be
continued as bodies corporate for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits
by or against them...."
21 Cal. Civ. Code 1941, § 399, refers to continued existence "for the purpose of
winding up its affairs, prosecuting and defending actions," but specifies that no
"action or proceeding to which a corporation is a party shall abate by the dtsssolution" of the corporation. Again, the court Ignored the word "proceeding" on which
the court concerned with the instant case placed much importance.
22 Vernon's Anno. Civ. Tex. Stat. 1936, VoL 3, § 1388.
23 202 F. (2d) 929 (1953).
24 44 F. Supp. 765 (1942).
25 Vernon's Anno. Civ. Tex. Stat. 1936, Vol. 3, § 1390.
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brought in a federal court, the effect of the dissolution of the corporation would, in the absence of a federal statute on the subject, have to be
decided on the basis of the common law, which did not permit an action
to survive the death of the corporation.26 The case is not cited for its
legal significance so much as to evidence the tortuous reasoning some courts
will apply in dealing with this problem.
It is recognized that, pursuant to those decisions which hold contrary
to the instant case, a corporation faced with a criminal proceeding could
abate the action by dissolving, merging, or consolidating and thereby free
itself from criminal liability in a fashion which would practically invite,
if not encourage, corporations to violate the law, 27 hence the instant case,
construing the Delaware statute to include criminal as well as civil actions,
strikes at a potential evil even if it is not the better-reasoned of the decisions. In the absence of a decision by the United States Supreme Court
28
and with no state court decision providing a binding local interpretation,
there would seem to be occasion for all law makers to examine their own
state statutes to determine whether they provide for a survival of criminal
as well as civil remedies and, if they do not, 29 to make suitable statutory
changes so as to prevent corporations from circumventing the criminal law.
H. J. JOSTOCK, JR.

DEATH-ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH-WHETHER OR NOT DEATH OF
DECEDENT'S ONLY HEIR AND NEXT OF KIN DURING PENDENCY OF ACTION
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF ACTION-The doctrine of

stare decisis appears to have gained new stature by reason of the decision

in the recent Ohio case of Danis v. New York Central Railroad Company.'
The decedent there concerned had been struck and killed by a locomotive
owned and operated by the defendant. Suit was brought by the adminis26 Sullivan v. Associated Bill Posters and Distributors, 6 F. (2d) 1000, 42 A. L. R.
503 (1925).
27 Marcus, "Liability of Dissolved Corporations," 58 Harv. L. Rev. 675 (1945).
But see Pierce v. United States, 255 U. S. 398, 41 S. Ct. 365, 65 L. Ed. 691 (1921),
as to the right to follow the corporate property into the hands of transferees and
former shareholders.
28 It would control, if one did exist, by virtue of the holding in Erie R. Co. v.

Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
29 The terminology of the Illinois statute on the subject should prove to be of
interest. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.94, in part, states: "The dissolution of a corporation ... shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or
against such corporation . . . for any right or claim existing, or any liability
incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding . . . is commenced
within two years after the date of such dissolution." Italics added. The statute
would appear to be all-inclusive, but it has not yet received local interpretation on
the point here concerned.
1160 Ohio St. 474, 117 N. E. (2d) 39 (1954), affirming - Ohio App. -, 106 N. E.
(2d) 308 (1951). Weygandt, Ch. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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trator of the decedent's estate on behalf of the heir and next of kin to recover for the wrongful death. 2 During the pendency of this action the
only heir died, leaving heirs surviving her. On motion of the defendant,
the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant inasmuch as
no one remained, within the statutory class of beneficiaries, in whose behalf the action could be further prosecuted. The Ohio Court of Appeals
affirmed this judgment and, on allowance of a motion to certify the record,
the Supreme Court of Ohio also affirmed, basing their decision on a
precedent dating back some forty-five years.3 The majority opinion indicated that, if the case had been one of first impression, the court would
probably have held the other way, but the judges generally felt themselves constrained to follow precedent, hence achieved the result mentioned.
The decision rendered in the instant case receives some support from
holdings achieved in other jurisdictions 4 and criticism is not being directed
at the result attained, but the method employed in arriving at the decision
is one worthy of comment. The doctrine of "intellectual honesty," upon
which much of the esteem shown for the judicial -branch of the government
has been based, has apparently been disregarded in favor of the more
easily followed and less demanding doctrine of stare decisis. Certainly,
there is no other readily discernible reason for a court's resting its holding
on one old case when it believed the contrary view would have been the
one to adopt had the case been one of first impression. 5 As the state of
the law on the issue presented has been greatly modified since the older
case was decided, a point which the court did not choose to analyze with
anything resembling an "open" mind, the Supreme Court of Ohio appears
to have contributed little toward the clarification of another of those issues
which have arisen from carelessly-drawn legislative enactments.
It may be noted that the wrongful death statutes, in general, specify
three classes of beneficiaries who are entitled to recover for the wrongful
death, namely (1) the surviving spouse or children, (2) parents, if no
spouse or child survives, and (3) next of kin, if there is no surviving
spouse, child or parent. The mere factor of relationship, however, does
not entitle a member of the aforementioned classes to a recovery, for there
2 The action was based on Ohio Rev. Code, § 2125.02. It, like most such statutes,
restricts recovery to a limited class of statutory beneficiaries. Compare with Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
3 Doyle, Adm'x v. B. & 0. B. Co., 81 Ohio St. 184, 90 N. E. 165 (1909).
4 The cases are listed in an annotation in 13 A. L. R. 225 as supplemented by
later annotations in 34 A. L. R. 162 and 59 A. L. R. 760.
5 The majority opinion illustrates the truth of the old adage that there is no more
effective way to defeat justice than simply to delay It. In the first of the Ohio
cases, the alleged wrongful death occurred in the year 1888 and final decision was
not rendered until twenty-one years later. In the instant case, the alleged wrongful
death occurred over eight years ago.
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is a further statutory requirement that the beneficiary must have sustained
a "pecuniary" loss by the death as the statutes fall into the loss-of-support
rather than the survival-of-remedy category. Assuming that the interested
persons have sustained such a loss, the first important question to be considered is the effect of the death of a beneficiary or beneficiaries of a prior
class upon the rights of the beneficiaries of a subsequent class.
Two answers have been given to this question. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Wells-Dickey Trust Company,6 for
example, a sister of the deceased brought suit for his wrongful death and
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss after learning that the decedent's
mother had survived him but had died prior to commencement of the
action. The court held that the beneficial interest did not shift, following
the death of the member of the prior class, to a member of the subsequent
class and the failure to bring action in the mother's lifetime had not
resulted in creating a new cause of action, upon the mother's death, for
the benefit of the sister. This view was followed in the Indiana case of
Shipley v. Daly,7 the court there stating that, if there were no survivors
of the first class, the right of action would accrue to the benefit of the
second class, if any, and if none, then to the benefits of those of the third
class, but that the right, once it had accrued, was not transmissible from
the beneficiaries of one class to the next succeeding class. In contrast
s
thereto, in the cases of Garrard v. Mahoning Valley Railroad Company
and Arendt v. Kratz,9 it was held that if the preferred beneficiary had
died before suit was instituted, the cause of action could be maintained
in behalf of the surviving beneficiaries of the next entitled class.10
Accepting for this purpose, the view that the right of action does not
shift between the designated classes, the question then becomes one as to
whether or not, upon the death of the favored beneficiary, the action survives, as a property right, for the benefit of such person's estate, if not
enforced during lifetime, or whether the cause must abate upon the death
In Odlivak v. Elliott,12 an action brought by
of the prime beneficiary. 1
6 275 U. S. 161, 48 S. Ct. 73, 72 L. Ed. 216, 59 A. L. R. 758 (1927).
7 106 Ind. App. 443, 20 N. E. (2d) 653 (1939).
8 100 Ohio St. 212, 126 N. E. 53 (1919). The holding therein is to be distinguished
from the one in the instant case on the point of whether or not the prior beneficiary
had instituted suit.
9 258 Wis. 437, 46 N. W. (2d) 219 (1951).
10 See also Elkin v. Southern Ry., 156 S. C. 390, 153 S. E. 337 (1930).
11 In those instances where, by statute, the action is to be conducted by a personal
representative, albeit for the particular benefit of a specified class of statutory
beneficiaries, the death of the personal representative, whether before or after suit
has been begun, should be of no significance as the successor personal representative,
upon appointment, would be vested with all rights belonging to the predecessor:
Kurth v. Forreston State Bank, 348 Il. App. 581, 109 N. E. (2d) 795 (1952).
12 82 F. Supp. 607 (1949).
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an administrator on behalf of the widow of the decedent, who had died
nine hours after her husband, it was held that rights accruing under the
statute13 to the widow would not be abated by her death but would survive
to her estate1 4 on the basis that an action for wrongful death is a suit for
an injury done to the property rights of the beneficiary which, once
accrued, would not be extinguished by the death of the specific beneficiary.'"
The damages recoverable would, however, be limited to the
pecuniary loss suffered up to the time of the beneficiary's death. 16
The opposing view, exemplified in the instant case, and followed in a
few jurisdictions, 17 has been exposed to criticism in the case of Van Beeck
v. Sabine Towing Company.'s Mr. Justice Cardozo there traced the history
of wrongful death actions from the original Lord Campbell's Act 19 to the
present time and provided a most thorough analysis of the problem at bar.
He did not disturb the prior holding to the effect that the beneficial interest
would not shift from one class to another 20 but did point out that, in the
situation before him, the cause ought not to abate, saying: "Death statutes
have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the law which
have been traced to their origin in the course of this opinion. It
would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process of construction
were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to be remedied.''21 Inasmuch as the death of the wrongdoer does not operate to destroy the cause
of action, 22 it is difficult to understand why the death of the statutory
beneficiary, whether before or after suit has been begun, should produce
a contrary result.
Any attempt to correlate the principles here enumerated with the
Illinois law on the subject requires the consideration of two important
13 N. J.Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 47, § 2:47-1. The statute Is similar incontent to Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 700, § 2.
14 The cases of Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n v. Denson, 214 Miss. 397, 57 So.
(2d) 859 (1952), and Greco, Adm'r v. S. S. Kresge Co., 227 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. (2d)
557 (1938), have also promulgated similar rulings based on statutes to be found in
these states.
15 White v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 125 Kan. 537, 265 P. 73 (1928); Stutz v.
Guardian Cab Corp., 273 App. Div. 4, 74 N. Y. S. (2d) 818 (1947).
16 Dostie v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co., 136 Md. 284, 8 A. (2d) 393 (1939).
17 Rogers v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co., 91 S. W. (2d) 458 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1936) ; Gilkeson v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 222 Mo. 173, 121 S. W. 138, 17 Ann. Cas. 763
(1909) ; Schmidt v. Menasha Woodenware Co., 99 Wis. 300, 74 N. W. 797 (1898).
18 300 U. S.342, 57 S.Ct. 452, 81 L. Ed. 685 (1937).
19 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846). This earliest of the wrongful death statutes has
served as a model for most American enactments.
20 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Wells-Dickey Trust Co., 275 U. S.161, 48 S.Ct. 73,
72 L. Ed. 216 (1927).
21 300 U. S.342 at 350-1, 57 S. Ct. 452, 81 L. Ed. 685 at 690.
22 Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal. (2d) 288, 169 P. (2d) 913 (1946).
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24
cases. 23 In Union Steamboat Company v. Chaffin's Administrators, a
federal court, applying the law of Illinois, held that a right of action for
wrongful death accrued immediately upon that death, became an asset of
the beneficiary, and was not affected by the subsequent death of such
beneficiary. The second case, that of Wilcox v. Bierd,25 however, tends to
generate some doubt on the point. The decedent there concerned, together
with his wife and two children, rode in a car which was struck by defendant's locomotive. The wife and one child were killed instantly and
the decedent died ten minutes later. The other child, who was nine
months old at the time, died thirty minutes after the decedent from injuries sustained in the collision. An administrator sued on behalf of this
infant and the decedent's parents, whom he had helped to support. It
was held that, upon the death of the infant child, the cause of action
abated and no right of action survived for the benefit of the parents of the
decedent since they were not in the same class of beneficiaries. If the
rule of the case was no broader than one to the effect that, upon the death
of the sole beneficiary of the preferred class, the cause of action would
not shift to a subsequent class, the two cases could be said to be in harmony.
Insofar as the cause of action on behalf of the infant abated, however, the
two cases are in conflict. It is worthy of notice that, since the infant lived
only thirty minutes longer than the decedent, the pecuniary loss suffered
was negligible so the court, for practical reasons, may have decided to disallow the claim rather than award nominal damages. Nevertheless, the
case has been cited in support of the doctrine that the right of action will
abate on the death of the beneficiary in whom the cause of action resides.2 6

This noting of the apparently divergent holdings in the only two
cases wherein the Illinois statute has been applied to the problem generated
by the death of an entitled beneficiary before recovery, leads to the suggestion that Illinois could readily assume a leading position in the field, in
addition to providing clarification for its own law, if the legislature would
survival
amend the statute to provide specifically for either abatement or 27
If it
beneficiary.
preferred
the
of
death
the
upon
action
of the cause of
remedy.
does so act, it should support the idea of survival of
P. J. SHANNON
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2, like most such statutes, is intended to
preserve the specified beneficiary's right to support. If no beneficiary survives, the
cause of action is then limited to a minor one for burial expenses and the like. See,
however, the case of Gustafson v. Consumers Sales Agency, 414 Ill. 235, 110 N. E.
(2d) 865 (1953), for an illustration of the length to which a court may go, from the
procedural standpoint, to sustain a wrongful death case if possible.
24204 F. 412 (1913), cert. den. 229 U. S. 620, 33 S. Ct. 778, 57 L. Ed. 1354 (1913).
25 330 Ill. 571, 162 N. E. 170 (1928).
26 See 26 C. J. S., Death, § 40.
27 Tenn. Code 1932, § § 8242-3, provides an illustration of what could be done.
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INTERNAL REVENUE-INcomE TAXES---WHETHER A TAXPAYER, IN CoMPUTING NET INCOME FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES, MAY DEDUCT
ATTORNEYS' FEES PAID TO DEFEND AGAINST A DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENT FOR

FEDERAL ESTATE TAxES-In the form of the case of Northern Trust Com-

pany v. Campbell,l a federal court has once again been provided with an
opportunity to pass upon the right of a taxpayer to deduct non-business
attorneys' fees from his gross income for income tax purposes. On
the facts of the case, taxpayer's father had created a trust in 1934 under
which he had named his wife as life beneficiary and his son, the taxpayer
in question, as remainderman. The wife died shortly after the husband
and the taxpayer became entitled to the corpus of the trust. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, after the father's estate had been closed,
claimed that an estate tax was due on the corpus of the trust 2 and that
3
the taxpayer, as transferee, was liable for the alleged estate tax deficiency.
The taxpayer paid under protest, was successful in his suit to recover the
overassessment, 4 but was forced to expend a substantial sum for attorneys'
fees in that connection so deducted this expenditure from his current federal income tax return. The taxing authorities rejected the deduction and
forced payment of an increased income tax. Plaintiff, as trustee under
the will of the taxpayer, then filed suit to recover this alleged overpayment and not only secured a favorable judgment in the lower court but
also, on the Collector's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, succeeded in sustaining the tax deduction.
Plaintiff's theory of recovery had been based upon Section 23(a) (2)
of the Internal Revenue Code, 5 his argument being that, as he had been
obliged to bring suit to conserve the size of his own property interest as a
remainderman from illegal taxation, the legal fees incurred in that suit
constituted an expense directly incurred by the taxpayer in relation to
the "conservation" of his income-producing property. Defendant, on the
other hand, centered the defense on Section 24(a) (1), with its prohibition
1211 F. (2d) 251 (1954).
2 The claim was predicated upon 26 U. S. C. A. § 811(c).
326 U. S. C. A. § 827(b) states: "iIf... the decedent makes a transfer, by trust
or otherwise, of any property In contemplation of or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death . . . and if in either case the tax in
respect thereto is not paid when due, then the transferee, trustee, or beneficiary
shall be personally liable for such tax, and such property, to the extent of the
decedent's interest therein at the time of such transfer . . . shall be subject to a
like lien equal to the amount of such tax."
4 See McKinstry v. Harrison. The holding therein was not officially reported but
may be noted in 34 A. F. T. R. 1670.
526 U. S. C. A. § 23(a) (2) states that, in computing net income, there shall be
allowed as deductions "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year for the production or collection of Income, or for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income."
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against the deduction of "personal" expenses," and Section 827(b),
designed to make the transferee "personally" liable for an estate tax
deficiency. 7 On this argument, the court concluded that it "is not the
personal liability but rather the nature of the expense itself, and the
proximate relation to the business or income-producing property of the
taxpayer which is the standard for determining whether an expense is deductible."8 Such being the case, it followed that, as the alleged tax was
assessed against the income produced by the property and the expense had
been incurred as a direct consequence of preventing an assessment against
that property, the mere fact that the liability for the tax was a personal
one was not enough to make the expense item non-deductible. By so
holding, the court appears to have established the rule that, even though
an expense be incurred to defend against a personal liabilty, if the attempt
to impose that liability is directed against income-producing property,
particularly if it proves to be unsuccessful, the expense would not be a
"personal" one but would be tax deductible under Section 23(a) (2).
Prior to 1942, the year in which Section 23(a) (2) was enacted, nonbusiness expenses were not deductible although the income from such
sources was fully taxable. The injustice of this position, as revealed in a
series of cases which reached the United States Supreme Court, 9 induced
Congress to pass the section mentioned in aid of those whose non-trade or
non-business economic activities produced an income but whose expenses
in relation to such activities could not properly be termed business expenses.10 Since then, it has been the theory of the statute that one should
be taxed only on net income and that expenses incurred in the production
of income or arising from income-producing property should be deductible."
Probably the leading case affording interpretation of Section 23 (a) (2)
insofar as the same is here involved is that of Trustees of Bingham v. Corn6 Ibid., § 24(a) (1), in part, reads: "In computing net income no deduction shall
in any case be allowed in respect of (1) personal, living, or family expenses."
7 The pertinent text thereof is set forth in note 3, ante.
8 211 F. (2d) 251 at 253.
9 See Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 212, 61 S. Ct. 475, 85 L. Ed. 783 (1941),
to the effect that the cost of mangaging a taxpayer's securities was not a trade or
business expense. Deduction of a trustee's fee from gross income was denied in
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering, 313 U. S. 121, 61 S. Ct. 896, 85 L. Ed.
1227 (1941), on the theory the trust was an investment rather than a business. See
also United States v. Pyne, 313 U. S. 127, 61 S. Ct. 893, 85 L. Ed. 1231 (1941), as to
office expenses and executor's fees in the management and administration of an
estate.
10 Business expenses are covered by 26 U. S. C. A. § 23(a) (1).
11 See H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). See also Brodsky and
McKibbin, "Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses," 2 Tax L. Rev. 39
(1946), and Nahstoll, "Non-Trade and Non-Business Expenses Deductions: Section
23(a) (2) of Internal Revenue Code," 46 Mich. L. Rev. 1015 (1948).
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missioner of Internal Revenue12 wherein the court held that legal fees incurred by a trustee in unsuccessfully contesting an income tax deficiency
assessed against the trust, expenses for legal advice in connection with the
payment of a cash legacy, and legal expenses arising out of final distribution were all deductible. Construing the section in question to be in pari
materia with the preceding section relating to the deduction of those
expenses which are directly connected with or proximately result from
the conduct of a business, the court there indicated that the same standard
should be applied to non-trade or non-business income items, a standard
which is now popularly referred to as the "proximate relation" test. It
,must be noted, however, that in Commissioner v. Heide18 and in Commissioner v. Josephs14 this test was not applied. The facts in both cases
were similar in that, in each case, a non-professional fiduciary had settled
a claim based on the idea that he had been negligent in the discharge of his
duties and sought to deduct the cost of that settlement from his gross
income. Admitting that the expense was incurred in connection with income-producing property, the courts concerned nevertheless held the expense was not needed for the production or collection of income, or for
the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income. 15 If these courts had carefully read the Bingham
case and had given notice to the fact that expenses involved in defending
suits charging mismanagement by professional fiduciaries had been held
deductible as business expenses, even in cases where negligence or fraud
had been proved,' 6 they would probably have reached a contrary result
for it would seem proper to treat professional and non-professional fiduciaries alike.

17

An argument has been made, based upon the cases of Cobb v. Commissioner 5 and Lykes v. United States, 9 that a claimed deduction for
12 325 U. S. 365, 65 S. Ct. 1232, 89 L. Ed. 1670 (1945).
13 165 F. (2d) 699 (1947).
14 168 F. (2d) 233 (1948), noted in 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 251 and 1949 Ill. L.
Forum 160.
15 In Commissioner v. Heide, 165 F. (2d) 699 (1947), the court indicated that if
negligence had not been proved the expense for legal fees would have been deductible, but said the settlement was prima facie proof of negligence.
16 Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145, 48 S. Ct. 219, 72 L. Ed. 505 (1928);
Anderson v. Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 457 (1936); Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.
(2d) 358 (1935) ; Central Trust Co. v. Burnet, 45 F. (2d) 922 (1930).
17 The author of an unsigned note in 58 Yale L. Rev. 781, at page 786, states:
"There is no public policy which forbids deduction of mismanagement expenses.
Fiduciary negligence would not be encouraged; few fiduciaries would be delinquent
solely because, if sued and held liable, they could get a tax deduction partially
offsetting their loss. Even if there were a temptation, it would not Justify different
treatment for casual as opposed to professional fiduciaries."
18 173 F. (2d) 711 (1949), noted in 63 Harv. L. Rev. 357 and 18 U. Cin. L. Rev. 350.
19343 U. S. 118, 72 S. Ct. 5a5, 89 L. Ed. 791 (1952), noted in 5 Vanderbilt L. Rev.
847 and 20 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 247.
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amounts paid out for attorneys' fees, except when clearly in the category
of business expense, would be improper. In those cases, however, donors
had made gifts and gift tax deficiencies were thereafter assessed. When
the donors attempted to deduct attorneys' fees incurred in connection
with litigating the tax assessments, treating the same as non-business expenses involved in the conservation of income-producing property, it was
possible for the courts to say that these expenditures were non-deductible
because the liability arose from the transfer of property as a gift, an activity not leading to the production or collection of income or to the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income but one well calculated to produce the direct opposite.
These holdings, then, can be said to do very little to limit the "proximate
relation" doctrine other than to point out that it is not applicable to gift
transactions.
Much the same argument was raised in the case of Baer v. Commissioner,20 one wherein the taxpayer, involved in a divorce suit, had employed
the services of counsel not with respect to the divorce proceedings proper
but only in the working out of an alimony settlement, payable in installments over a long period of time, so as to prevent the lessening of the taxpayer's stockholdings, which fact would not only have produced a reduction
in his income but would also have deprived him of control of a corporation.
The court, nevertheless, held that the attorney's fees were a deductible
item under Section 23(a) (2), being incurred in relation to the conservation of property held for the production of income and not simply one involving a personal expense. The taxpayer, apparently, had not paid the
legal fees to prevent or lessen his liability to his wife but, rather, had
expended the money to arrange a method for the adjustment of that liability under which his stock, retention of which was essential in order to
enable him to receive an income, would not be taken to satisfy that liability.
If anything, the case expands rather than confines the "proximate relation" test for the original cause of the expense was not attributable to any
income-producing property so much as it was to the taxpayer's wrongful
acts toward his wife.
Closely analogous to the holding in the instant case is the decision in
Allen v. Selig.21 A wife had there successfully sued to exclude from
her husband's estate, for federal estate tax purposes, certain property
which had been purchased by him with their joint savings but the title to
which had been taken in his name. She was held entitled to deduct the
expense of such litigation, under Section 23(a) (2), on the rationale that
the suit so instituted was one designed to conserve income-producing prop20 196 F. (2d) 646 (1952).
21 200 F. (2d) 487 (1952), noted in 2 J. Public Law 215.
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erty which she owned from the assertion of an estate tax lien on the same.
The legal fees there incurred were proximately related to the conservation of property without which the income would have suffered a reduction.
After giving consideration to the intent which Congress possessed at
the time it enacted the statute in question and all applicable and analogous cases, it should be reasonably apparent that it would have been unjust and inequitable if the court had reached any other decision in the
instant case than the one it did achieve. Not only did the litigation arise
directly because of the existence of income-producing property, that is
the corpus of the trust, but it was necessary for the taxpayer to spend
money to protect that property from being illegally assessed. It is difficult to see how any other expense could have been more "proximately
related" to the conservation of income-producing property than the one
in question. The fact that the government was there attempting to obtain
a personal judgment against the taxpayer should not serve to alter the
situation and if, by forcing the issue, the government suffered a loss of
tax revenue, one could appropriately remark that it deserved to lose the
same.
H. JOSToCK

PARENT AND CHILD-SUPPORT OF PARENT BY CHIL--WIIETHER op NOT,
N

ABSENCE

01' CONTRAC'T, ONE ADULT

CHILD MAY SECURE CONTRIBUTION

FRoM ANOTHER FOR SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE FURNISHED AN INDIGENT PARENT-An unusual issue of Illinois law was recently generated in

the case of Shaver v. Brierton' wherein the plaintiff, relying on an alleged
implied in law contract, commenced an action against her brother before
a justice of the peace seeking contribution for money expended in the
support and maintenance of their indigent mother. On appeal to an
appropriate circuit court, 2 the matter was heard on trial de novo before a
jury and a verdict was reached in plaintiff's favor, on which verdict judgment was pronounced. On further appeal, the Appellate Court for the
Second District, while agreeing with the defendant's contention that, in
the absence of contract or statute, no reciprocal duty would be owed among
adult children to contribute to the support of their parents, affirmed
the judgment on the basis that a statute which admittedly imposed a qualified duty on adult children to support their indigent parents3 constituted a sufficient statutory mandate to render the non-supporting child
liable by way of contribution to the supporting child.
11 Ill. App. (2d) 192, 117 N. E. (2d) 298 (1954).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 79, § 116.
8 Ibid., Ch. 23, § 439-2.
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It is clear that, at common law, a child was under no legal duty to
support his parents, 4 even though they might have owed a duty to support the child prior to emancipation, and there was at least a dictum
in Illinois cases of People v. Hl 5 to the effect that no legal duty existed
despite the fact the parents were aged, infirm, or destitute. As the
older portion of the population has increased, however, most states have
found it necessary to enact legislation providing for the care and maintenance of those in this class who might be unable, because of infirmity,
illness, or the like, to care for themselves.8 In the main, legislation of this
character has been directed toward the providing of public assistance but, to
conserve the public treasury, procedures have been outlined whereby some
public official, usually a county officer, may commence legal action against
certain named relatives of the supported person to the end that the state
might be reimbursed for the money so expended. 7 While the majority of
these statutes are similar in character, courts have experienced difficulty in
determining the extent of the duty placed upon the indigent person's relatives, particularly with respect to the point as to whether the legislature intended to benefit the indigent person or whether it designed merely
to protect the public purse.
Illustrating one view is the New York case entitled Anonymous v.
Anonymous s wherein it was declared that the primary, in fact the essential, objective of the New York statute9 was to relieve the state of a
growing financial burden by placing it where the legislature deemed it
to belong. Nevertheless, since the legal obligation was statutory only, the
court would not extend the child's liability beyond the terms of the statute
creating it' ° and the statutory provisions for enforcement were held to
be exclusive. 1 ' This view was followed in the West Virginia case of Con4 Rex v. Munden, 1 Strange 190, 93 Eng. Rep. 465 (1719) ; Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Cal.
140, 84 P. 838, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159 (1906).
5 163 Ill. 186, 46 N. E. 796, 36 L. R. A. 634 (1896).
8 See, in general, Vernier, American Family Laws, Vol. 4, § 235.
7 The right to secure reimbursement from the supported person, If he should later
become able to repay, has been specifically preserved by statute: Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 440-4 and § 443-18. For an analogous case with respect to
the right of the state to charge the mentally incompetent person for the care provided, see Kough v. Hoehler, 413 Ill. 409, 109 N. E. (2d) 177 (1952).
s 176 Misc. 103, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 597 (1941). The action was one by a mother
against her son to compel the son to provide support.
9 New York Public Welfare Law, § 125. It should be noted that this section is
substantially Identical with New York Code of Criminal Procedure, § 914.
10 Harrigan v. Cahill, 100 Misc. 48, 164 N. Y. S. 1005 (1917); Herendeen v.
DeWitt, 49 Hun. 53, 1 N. Y. S. 467 (1888).
11 Matter of Salm's Guardianship, 171 Misc. 367, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 678 (1939),
affirmed in 258 App. Div. 875, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 1021 (1939). Except for the fact
the Illinois statute differs slightly in that it expressly provides that anyone may
bring the statutory action on behalf of the Indigent parent to compel support by
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,nell v. ConneU1 2 which, like the instant case, was one by a son against another son for contribution. The plaintiff there contended that the West
Virginia statute operated to create a duty sufficient to render the nonsupporting son liable but the court, rejecting this contention, pointed to
the fact that the statutory provision was part of a chapter relating to
the state Department of Public Assistance and, as the case did not concern the allowance of public assistance, was inapplicable. It did say,
however, that the court's attention had "not been directed to a statutory
provision which would justify a recovery of advances made to support
parents by one son against another,'"18 so it would seem that a provision
enabling the state to secure reimbursement or to save it from being forced
to expend public funds would not, of its own weight, confer a right on
one child to recover money voluntarily expended from another even though
14
the latter may be equally liable to the state.
Two leading cases may serve to illustrate the contrary view. In the
first of them, that of Howie v. Gangloif,15 an action was begun by a sister
against her two brothers based on a Minnesota statute16 which purported
to make children liable for the support of their parents.
The court,
pointing to the fact that the rights of one claiming public support were
not in question, nevertheless construed the statute to be intended for the
benefit of the indigent person and not solely for the benefit of the state
but did call attention to another issue which would seem to be important,
that is one child may not voluntarily furnish support to the parent
without first notifying the other children that he will expect contribution
if he is to recover from them. The second case, that of Wood v. Wheat,17
involved similar issues but with the added fact that the Kentucky statute' provided for punishment for neglect of the duty to support. 19 The
court construed the act to be for the benefit of the indigent person, hence
the child, it would seem to be comparable to the New York provision in its silence
as to the person, other than the public agency which has provided support, to be
benefited by the action.
12 131 W. Va. 209, 46 S. E. (2d) 724 (1948).
18 131 W. Va. 209 at 215, 46 S. E. (2d) 724 at 727.
14 If the state has forced one child to pay the full charge, there might be room for
restitution on the theory the plaintiff was compelled to confer a benefit, rather than
did so voluntarily, in relieving the defendant of his statutory obligation.
15 165 Minn. 346, 206 N. W. 441, 98 A. L. R. 876 (1925).
16 Minn. Gen. Stat. 1923, § 3151.
17 226 Ky. 762, 11 S. W. (2d) 916 (1928).
18 Ky. Rev. Code, § 331f.
19 An Ohio court has refused to enforce civil liability against a non-supporting
child where the only statute involved contained criminal sanctions: Gardner v.
Hines, 68 N. E. (2d) 397 (Ohio Com. Pleas, 1946). As to local enforcement of a
foreign statute relating to support, compare Commonwealth v. Mong, 160 Ohio St.
455, 117 N. E. (2d) 32 (1954), with Commonwealth ex rel. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 175
Pa. Super. 100, 103 A. (2d) 430 (1954).
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was willing to construe the pertinent sections liberally, 20 but denied recovery because the plaintiff had not notified the defendants that support
was being given to the mother. 21 Admitted that one should not be permitted to erect a quasi-contractual obligation as an afterthought upon a
gratuity conferred, 22 the fuss the court there raised over the matter of
notice stands in sharp contrast to the extremely liberal construction given
to the statute.
The decision in the instant case makes no mention of the need for notice since the plaintiff there concerned had made repeated exhortations
to her brother to contribute and had clearly evidenced an intention to
act in other than a voluntary and donative fashion. The case would, however, seem to be remarkable in that the court, extending the statute beyond its apparent scope, may have opened the door to the creation of civil
liability on the part of a child to third persons, other than the state and
close relatives, who may have supplied aid to the indigent parent. 23 If the
decision should stand, one who has shirked what is everywhere regarded
as at least a moral duty may learn that, thanks to judicial construction
of the statute in question, he has also become derelict in a legal duty.
Illinois will then be joined with those jurisdictions which have not only
worried about the state of the public purse but have expressed concern
for the honest citizen who has accepted and discharged those duties placed
upon him by both the moral and the civil law.
G. A. FAIRIELD

20 The Kentucky law is discussed in Griffin, "Civil Liability of Child to Support
Indigent Parent in Kentucky," 39 Ky. L. J. 451 (1950).
21 The court, 226 Ky. 762 at 766, 11 S. W. (2d) 916 at 918, said: "But in order
that one child may impose upon the others the burden of contribution, notice should
be given in order that all the children may have equal opportunity to provide the
service and supply the needs of the indigent parent. If one child supports a dependent parent, that fact relieves all the children from liability to prosecution
under the statute, but when that child expects to hold the others liable to him for
contribution, he should give them notice and afford them an equal opportunity to
perform the duty for pay, or to make a contribution for the purpose. It may be
that the other children acquiesced in the support that was being given in the belief
that it was without desire or expectation of compensation."
22 Clary v. Clary, 93 Me. 220, 44 A. 921 (1899).
23 A discussion of the right of a third person to sue a non-supporting child to
recover money expended in the support of the parent may be found in the case of
Bismarck Hospital and Deaconess Home v. Harris, 68 N. D. 374, 280 N. W. 423,
116 A. L. R. 1274 (1938).

